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 NOTE 
Widening the Power Gap: The Eighth 
Circuit’s Stringent Requirements for Class 
Actions in Environmental Contamination 
Cases 
Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2017) 
Emily Holtzman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pipeline construction is booming in the United States, yet it remains a 
polarizing topic for many because of environmental concerns.  On the one 
hand, pipelines bring increased energy independence for the United States 
and are one of the safest ways to transport oil and gas.1  At the same time, 
fears of environmental damage have led to a growing and fierce opposition to 
pipeline construction.2  After the massive offshore rig spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 2010, resistance to new projects like the Keystone Pipeline has 
received widespread media coverage.  The protests of the Dakota Access 
Pipeline on the Standing Rock Reservation, in particular, portrayed how high 
tensions have risen over pipeline construction.3  As quieter protests continue 
across the country against various new and old pipeline constructions and 
spills, questions about liability and accountability of the oil industry in the 
future of environmental degradation have largely been left unanswered.4 
 
* B.A., University of Missouri 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2020; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2019–2020.  I would like to 
thank Professor Rigel Oliveri for her guidance and support during the writing of this 
Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review editorial staff for their assistance in editing. 
 1. See Charles Hughes, America Needs More Pipelines, U.S. NEWS (July 20, 
2017), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2017-07-
20/america-needs-more-pipelines-to-transport-oil-and-gas-safely. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See e.g., Justin Worland, What to Know About the Dakota Access Pipeline 
Protests, TIME (Oct. 28, 2016), http://time.com/4548566/dakota-access-pipeline-
standing-rock-sioux/. 
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In 2013, a portion of the Pegasus Pipeline5 (the “Pipeline”) ruptured 
near Mayflower, Arkansas, spilling about 134,000 gallons of heavy crude oil 
and forcing nearby residents to evacuate their homes.6  The Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) classified the leak as a “major spill.”7  Twenty-
two homes were evacuated, and nearby wildlife was majorly affected for 
years following the spill.8  Property owners with land subject to the easement 
contracts with Exxon (“Plaintiffs”) brought a class action lawsuit against 
Exxon Mobil Corporation, ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, and Mobil Pipe 
Line Company (collectively, “Exxon”) for breach of contract, alleging Exxon 
operated the Pipeline in an unsafe and defective condition.9  In 2014, the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas certified the class action; 
however, on reconsideration in 2015, the court decertified the class.10  The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed this decision in 2017.11 
This Note argues this class should have been able to proceed to adjudi-
cate its claims under either Rule 23(b)(2) or Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  The Eighth Circuit’s decision to decertify the class 
in Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp. will deprive property owners of control and 
agency over their land when faced with environmental contamination or dis-
aster resulting from the conduct of a large and powerful corporation.  In light 
of the massively uneven power dynamic that exists between pipeline opera-
tors and individual property owners across the country, removing class adju-
dication as a possibility to hold these operators liable for potential mistakes 
further widens this power gap.  Landowners, towns, municipalities, and resi-
dents should be aware of the repercussions of this decision in making future 
 
 5. The Pegasus Pipeline runs through properties in Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, 
and Illinois and is subject to easement contracts in all of these states.  Webb v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150, 1153–54 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 6. Id. at 1154; Exxon Shuts Oil Pipeline After “Major” Spill in Arkansas, 
REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/exxon-pipeline-
spill/exxon-shuts-oil-pipeline-after-major-pipeline-spill-in-arkansas-
idUSL2N0CN00720130331. 
 7. Reference News Release: U.S. Settles with ExxonMobil over Violations 
Stemming from 2013 Oil Spill in Mayflower, Arkansas, EPA (Apr. 22, 2015), 
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/reference-news-release-us-settles-exxonmobil-
over-violations-stemming-2013-oil-spill [hereinafter Reference News Release]. 
 8. Kristen Hays & Matthew Robinson, Exxon Cleans Up Arkansas Oil Spill; 
Keystone Plan Assailed, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2013), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxon-pipeline-spill/exxon-cleans-up-arkansas-
oil-spill-keystone-plan-assailed-idUSBRE92U00220130331. 
 9. Amended Complaint for Petitioners at 2, Webb, 856 F.3d 1150 (No. 4:13 CV 
232 BSM), 2013 WL 9600153, ¶ 35. 
 10. Webb v. Exon Mobil Corp., No. 4:13CV00232 BSM, 2014 WL 11498052, at 
*5 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 12, 2014) (granting class certification in part); Webb v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., No. 4:13CV00232 BSM, 2015 WL 11090403, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 17, 
2015), aff’d on other grounds, 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2017) (reconsidering class 
certification, reversing, and granting defendant’s motion for summary judgement). 
 11. Webb, 856 F.3d 1150. 
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agreements with pipeline owners and operators, as well as any industries or 
facilities that carry major risks of environmental contamination. 
Part II of this Note provides the facts and holding of Webb.  Part III dis-
cusses the requirements of class action lawsuits under Rule 23(a) and Rule 
23(b) in light of Wal-Mart v. Dukes and other class action suits involving 
environmental contamination claims.  Part IV reviews the instant decision of 
the Eighth Circuit in Webb.  Part V explains why the Eighth Circuit adopted a 
standard for certifying classes that is too stringent, even after Dukes, and fur-
ther explains why the court erred in decertifying the class in Webb.  Part VI 
concludes this Note by explaining the impact this case will have on landown-
ers and easement holders in the future. 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
The Pipeline was constructed in 1947 and spans more than 650 miles 
through Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, and Illinois.12  Magnolia, the corporate 
predecessor of Exxon Mobil and the first owner of the Pipeline, entered into 
easement contracts with property owners in these four states to build the 
Pipeline alongside or across their properties.13  Magnolia used a low frequen-
cy electric resistance welding process to construct the Pipeline.14  This pro-
cess of welding was replaced industry wide with a high-frequency welding 
process in the 1970s after finding the low resistance construction was more 
susceptible to corrosion, cracks, and bonding issues.15  At the time of the spill 
in Mayflower, Exxon had upgraded approximately 200 miles of the original 
pipe with a stronger welding process.16 
The Pipeline was originally intended to transport crude oil from Texas 
up through Illinois, traveling south to north, but in 2009, Exxon reversed the 
flow of the oil while simultaneously increasing the amount of oil transported 
by the Pipeline by fifty percent, totaling 95,000 barrels per day.17  Exxon 
reversed the flow in order to transport tar sands, as opposed to the heavy 
crude it had transported for the past fifty years.18  Reversing the flow and 
 
 12. Webb, 856 F.3d 1150 at 1153–54. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *1, aff’d on other grounds, 856 F.3d 1150. 
 15. Id.; Fact Sheet: Pipe Manufacturing Process, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/FSPipeManufacturingProcess.htm 
(last updated Dec. 1, 2011). 
 16. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *1. 
 17. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1154. 
 18. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *1.  Tar sands are a sticky deposit containing 
bitumen (a type of petroleum that can be turned into fuel), and tar sands oil is much 
heavier and more corrosive than crude.  Melissa Denchak, What is the Keystone Pipe-
line?, NAT’L RESOURCE DEF. COUNCIL (Apr. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/what-keystone-pipeline. 
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transporting a much heavier oil through the aging Pipeline led many to ques-
tion if this was the direct cause of the 2013 spill in Mayflower.19    
In April of 2013, Plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Exxon, 
claiming that Exxon breached the easement contracts by failing to maintain 
and repair the Pipeline.20  Plaintiffs asked for relief in the form of “either (1) 
rescission of the easement contracts and removal of the [P]ipeline from the[] 
propert[ies], or (2) specific performance of the easement contract[s],” which 
would have required Exxon to replace the entirety of the Pipeline.21  Alter-
nately, Plaintiffs asked for compensatory damages for each class member if 
the first two types of relief failed.22 
Plaintiffs sought class certification under either Rule 23(b)(2) or Rule 
23(b)(3).23  Two couples represented the class: Rudy F. and Betty Webb and 
Arnez and Charletha Harper.24  Both couples owned real property subject to 
the easement contracts – the Webbs in Mayflower, Arkansas, and the Harpers 
in Conway, Arkansas.25  Plaintiffs estimated the size of the class to be in the 
thousands and included “all persons and entities who owned real property as 
of March 29, 2013, with an easement for the . . . Pipeline on their real proper-
ty from Patoka[,] Illinois[,] to Corsicana, Texas.”26 
Plaintiffs claimed Exxon materially breached the terms of the easements 
under a “common course of corporate policy, pattern, practice and wrongful 
conduct” by “failing to inspect, maintain, repair, and replace the [P]ipeline, 
resulting in hazardous conditions and damages to the . . . servient estates.”27  
Plaintiffs cited language in the form easement contracts stating that Magnolia 
“hereby agree[d] to pay any damages that may arise to crops, timber, or fenc-
es from the use of said premises for such purposes.”28  Plaintiffs also asserted 
 
 19. See Nora Caplan-Bricker, This Is What Happens When a Pipeline Bursts in 
Your Town, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 18, 2013), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/115624/exxon-oil-spill-arkansas-2013-how-pipeline-
burst-mayflower.  After the Mayflower spill and a spill that occurred in North Dakota 
when the Pipeline’s flow was reversed, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration issued an advisory to pipeline operators with safety guidelines for 
reversing the flow of pipelines.  See generally DEP’T OF TRANSPORTATION, PIPELINE 
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, PIPELINE SAFETY: GUIDANCE 
FOR PIPELINE FLOW REVERSALS, PRODUCT CHANGES AND CONVERSION TO SERVICE 
(2014), https://www.pipelinelaw.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/24/2014/09/Advisory_re_Flow_Reversals.pdf.  The advisory 
notes that reversal can impact pipeline function and lead to spills.  See id. at 2. 
 20. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1154, 1158. 
 21. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *1. 
 22. See Amended Complaint for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 18. 
 23. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *1. 
 24. Amended Complaint for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
 25. Id.  Neither couple suffered property damage as a result of the 2013 spill in 
Mayflower.  Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *1. 
 26. Amended Complaint for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 13–14. 
 27. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1154. 
 28. Amended Complaint for Petitioners, supra note 9, at 17–18. 
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that Exxon, as the holder of the easement, had an affirmative duty to maintain 
the property but breached this duty by operating the Pipeline in an “unsafe, 
defective, and unreasonably dangerous condition.”29  By breaching this duty, 
Plaintiffs ultimately alleged Exxon’s breach of the easement contracts “cre-
ate[d] an immediate zone of danger to the[m] . . . and class members who 
have the Pipeline on their property pursuant to an easement.”30 
A. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification 
In 2014, The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas 
certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3), finding Plaintiffs established the pre-
dominance requirement and that granting class certification was the superior 
method for litigating these claims to reduce “costs and the use of judicial 
resources.”31  The court found certification under Rule 23(b)(2) improper, 
reasoning that neither of the remedies that Plaintiffs’ sought for their sole 
breach of contract claim – “rescission of the easement contract or specific 
performance” –  were “tantamount to the injunctive relief that must be assert-
ed in order to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class action.”32  In light of this reason-
ing, the court denied certification under Rule 23(b)(2), instead finding certifi-
cation under Rule 23(b)(3) proper for the claims Plaintiffs brought.33 
The Eastern District found Plaintiffs met the numerosity requirement 
under Rule 23(a)(1) because the Pipeline spanned 650 miles, making joinder 
of all Plaintiffs impracticable.34  The Eastern District further concluded Plain-
tiffs satisfied commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) because their claims present-
ed common questions of law or fact – specifically whether Exxon failed to 
operate and maintain the Pipeline properly and whether this breached the 
easement contracts.35  The court also found Plaintiffs satisfied typicality un-
der Rule 23(a)(3) because their claims stemmed from “Exxon’s operation of 
the [P]ipeline.”36  To properly satisfy the requirement of adequacy under Rule 
23(a)(4), the court removed the Webbs as class representatives because even 
though their property was subject to an easement, the Pipeline did not actual-
ly touch the Webbs’ property.37 
Exxon contended, in part, the definition of the class was too broad be-
cause it could include property owners who sold their property prior to the 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 18. 
 31. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *4–5 (finding that Plaintiffs produced com-
mon evidence to show that common issues predominated on a “systematic, class-wide 
basis” and was “sufficiently cohesive”). 
 32. Id. at *4. 
 33. Id. at *5. 
 34. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *3; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
 35. Id. at *3; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 36. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *4; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). 
 37. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *3; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
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spill of 2013.38  In response to this, the Eastern District, sua sponte, narrowed 
the class definition to include “all persons and entities who currently own real 
property subject to an easement for the . . . Pipeline and who have pipeline 
physically crossing their property from Patoka, Illinois to Corsicana, Tex-
as.”39  The court determined Exxon’s other arguments in support of its motion 
to dismiss were better suited as defenses to present in the course of litigation 
and not as proper grounds for dismissal or for decertifying the class.40 
B. Exxon’s Motion for Reconsideration and Summary Judgment 
After the Eastern District granted class certification in 2014, Exxon mo-
tioned for reconsideration and summary judgment.41  At this reconsideration 
hearing, the court granted both motions.42  In determining Plaintiffs did not 
actually meet the requirement for commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), the court 
viewed the Pipeline as “a series of individual segments, with each segment 
corresponding to each individual landowner.”43  The court reasoned that if the 
Pipeline spilled in one place, it would have no real effect on a property owner 
subject to the Pipeline easement in a different state and that, because of this, 
Plaintiffs could not meet the commonality requirement.44  The court further 
held Plaintiffs could not satisfy the typicality requirement because to prove 
Exxon breached its easement contracts, the court would need to conduct an 
“individualized inquiry” into each property to resolve the claims.45  Because 
Plaintiffs could not meet these requirements, the court found they similarly 
could not meet the requirement of adequacy and decertified the class.46 
Another issue the court faced was the potential of invoking conflicting 
state property laws if Plaintiffs prevailed on their claims.47  Exxon and Plain-
tiffs disagreed about easement law in the four states the Pipeline ran through, 
with Plaintiffs arguing the laws were the same and Exxon arguing they dif-
fered substantially.48  The court, agreeing with Exxon, found Arkansas law 
was unique compared to the other states because Arkansas law defines ease-
 
 38. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *3. 
 39. Id. (emphasis added). 
 40. Id. (arguing that the pipe had been repaired in certain locations, so property 
owners in those locations and others not in Mayflower suffered no injury). 
 41. Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 4:13CV00232 BSM, 2015 WL 11090403, 
at *1 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 17, 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 
2017). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at *3. 
 44. Id. (“[S]imply because Exxon may not be fulfilling its duties on one person’s 
land does not necessarily mean it is not fulfilling its duties on all landowners’ proper-
ty.”). 
 45. Id. (citing Elizabeth M. v. Montenez, 458 F.3d 779, 787 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at *4. 
 48. Id. 
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ments solely as granting a right of way with no affirmative duty to repair or 
maintain the easement.49  Therefore, the court held a verdict in favor of Plain-
tiffs would create a potential problem of applying inconsistent state laws and 
granted summary judgment in favor of Exxon.50 
The court declined to determine if class certification was appropriate 
under Rule 23(b)(2), citing to its previous discussion that Plaintiffs’ claims 
did not appropriately fall under the injunctive requirement of a Rule 23(b)(2) 
class.51 
C. Plaintiffs’ Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth      
Circuit 
On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged the Eastern District’s decision to decer-
tify the class and grant summary judgment in favor of Exxon.52  The Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the Eastern District’s decision to decertify the class and grant 
summary judgment in favor of Exxon.53  The Eighth Circuit agreed with the 
Eastern District’s conclusion that because Exxon operated the Pipeline as 
individual segments, Plaintiffs could not meet the commonality requirement 
under Rule 23(a).54  The Eighth Circuit found that even if it came to the alter-
nate conclusion that Exxon operated the Pipeline as one segment, the injury 
Plaintiffs suffered was not the same because “establishing breach would re-
quire examination of how Exxon’s operation of the [P]ipeline affects . . . 
[P]laintiffs, which . . . varies depending on where the individual class mem-
bers’ property is located.”55  The Eighth Circuit concluded that because Plain-
tiffs could not meet the commonality requirement, they consequently could 
not meet the “far more demanding” predominance requirement under Rule 
23(b)(3) because “individual issues [of class members] predominate over 
common ones.”56 
In finding the Eastern District did not abuse its discretion by decertify-
ing the class, the Eighth Circuit echoed the Eastern District’s concern about 
the potential conflicting state laws arising under the contract, property, and 
tort claims Plaintiffs proposed.57  The Eighth Circuit hinged its reasoning on 
the fact that, under Arkansas property law, Exxon had no affirmative duty to 
repair or maintain the Pipeline as a term of the easement contracts.58  There-
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1156. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1156–57. 
 57. Id. at 1157. 
 58. Id. at 1158. 
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fore, the Eighth Circuit found no genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Exxon breached the easement contracts.59 
Because the Eighth Circuit determined Exxon had no affirmative duty to 
repair the Pipeline, it further held Plaintiffs could not show they suffered the 
same injury to meet either the commonality or predominance requirements.60  
The court was also concerned class litigation was not the superior method for 
litigating these claims because determining injury of Plaintiffs in the class in 
this case would require individual assessments of each Plaintiff’s property.61  
The Eighth Circuit affirmed class decertification, holding that where mem-
bers of a proposed class have suffered individualized injuries, the class can-
not meet the requirements for commonality and predominance under Rule 
23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).62 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Because the legal questions presented in Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp. fo-
cus on issues of class certification, this Part will begin with an overview and 
discussion of the relevant Rules.  This Part then will analyze various envi-
ronmental contamination cases where classes were both certified and decerti-
fied. 
A. Class Certification 
Under Rule 23(a), members of a class action must meet four require-
ments, commonly referred to as (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typi-
cality, and (4) adequacy.63  The requirement of numerosity is simply that the 
class of plaintiffs must be so large that joinder of all plaintiffs would be im-
practicable.64  The commonality requirement requires a class to show that 
“questions of law or fact common to the class” exist.65   To meet the typicali-
ty requirement, class representatives must show their claims or defenses are 
“typical of the claims of defenses of the class”; such a showing ensures the 
class representatives are members of the class and will pursue the class mem-
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 1157 (“[P]laintiffs here may assert all of the pipe for 850 miles is bad, 
but demonstrating breach is more complicated.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1156–57.  
 63. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). 
 64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).  While the Rules do not specify an exact number of 
plaintiffs that meet the numerosity requirement, it is typically apparent whether or not 
a proposed class meets this requirement, and numerosity determinations are rarely 
challenged.  WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:12, West 
(database updated Nov. 2018). 
 65. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
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bers’ claims.66  The final requirement of adequacy requires the class repre-
sentatives to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”67 
Once the class meets these four requirements, it must seek certification 
within one of the categories under Rule 23(b): 
(1) Prosecuting separate actions would result in inconsistent or varying 
adjudications; 
(2) Injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate for the class as a 
whole; 
(3) The common questions of law or fact predominate over any indi-
vidual issues of members of the class, and therefore class action is the 
superior method for adjudicating the claims.68 
Typically, classes seeking money damages must seek certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3) because many courts, including the United States Supreme 
Court, have held that Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) class adjudications are 
not proper for classes seeking individualized money damages.69 
Prior to 2011, the standard for meeting the commonality requirement 
under Rule 23(a)(2) was not a difficult one to meet.70  However, the United 
States Supreme Court’s holding in Wal-Mart v. Dukes made this requirement 
more stringent.71  In Dukes, a proposed class of current and former female 
employees of Wal-Mart brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, alleging Wal-Mart discriminated against female employees on 
the basis of sex.72  This class of 1.5 million current and past Wal-Mart em-
ployees was one of “the most expansive class actions ever.”73  Plaintiffs ar-
gued class certification was appropriate to adjudicate these claims because, 
while Wal-Mart did not have an “express corporate policy” against women, 
the strong “corporate culture” of the operation of the stores had a disparate 
impact on all of its female employees.74  The U.S. District Court for the 
 
 66. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 64, at § 3:28. 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 68. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(3). 
 69. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011). 
 70. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating 
that this requirement has been construed “permissively”); Mullen v. Treasure Chest 
Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the test for commonali-
ty is “not demanding”). 
 71. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350. 
 72. Id. at 342–43. 
 73. Id. at 342. 
 74. Id. at 344–45. 
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Northern District of California certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2),75 and 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed with a 6-5 vote.76 
The United States Supreme Court, in a decision that changed the future 
of class action litigation, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and decertified 
the class.77  Justice Antonin G. Scalia, writing for the majority, held it is not 
enough for members of a class to show they have “all suffered a violation of 
the same provision of law”; they must also show their claims “depend upon a 
common contention.”78  Plaintiffs must show this “common contention” to be 
“capable of classwide resolution” in that the “truth or falsity [of the claims] 
will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in 
one stroke.”79  Because so many of the discriminatory employment practices 
the class alleged were left to the discretion of lower level managers, plaintiffs 
did not sufficiently establish a “common mode of exercising discretion that 
pervade[d] the entire company.”80  As a result, the Court held the class did 
not satisfy the commonality requirement because it failed to establish a com-
mon contention capable of classwide resolution.81  Justice Scalia further 
agreed with Judge Alex Kozinski’s dissent in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, 
stating the class members in this case had “little in common but their sex and 
this lawsuit.”82 
Dukes has significantly changed the course of class action lawsuits.83  
Prior to Dukes, a proposed class could satisfy the commonality requirement 
by establishing a single common question.84  While the Court in Dukes did 
not specifically reject this previous standard for satisfying commonality, the 
 
 75. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 188 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d 
by Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d by 564 U.S. 
338 (2011).  
 76. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d by 564 
U.S. 338 (2011).  Judge Hawkins delivered the majority opinion joined by Judges 
Reinhardt, Fisher, Paez, and Berzon; Judge Graber concurred; Judge Ikuta dissented 
and was joined by Judges Kozinski, Rymer, Silverman, and Bea.  Id. 
 77. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 359 (holding that the class could not alternatively be 
certified under Rule 23(b)(3)). 
 78. Id. at 350. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 356. 
 81. Id. at 357 (“Merely showing that Wal-Mart’s policy of discretion has pro-
duced an overall sex-based disparity does not suffice.”). 
 82. Id. at 360 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 652 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)). 
 83. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
729, 774–75 (2013). 
 84. See Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48 (3d. Cir. 1994) (“[C]lass members can assert 
such a single complaint even if they have not all suffered actual injury; demonstrating 
that all class members are subject to the same harm will suffice.” (alteration in origi-
nal)). 
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Court held the class could not satisfy this requirement without “convincing 
proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and promotion policy.”85 
Closely related to the requirement of commonality is that of predomi-
nance, which is required for classes seeking certification under Rule 
23(b)(3).86  Rule 23(b)(3) certification differs slightly from the other catego-
ries of class certification because it was “designed to expand class action 
practice to include new categories of cases where class treatment ‘would 
achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of 
decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fair-
ness or bringing about other undesirable results.’”87  In Amchem Products, 
Inc. v. Windsor,88 the United States Supreme Court held the predominance 
requirement is meant to test “whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohe-
sive to warrant adjudication by representation” to determine if “common 
questions ‘predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers.’”89  To determine whether a class is “sufficiently cohesive,” the Court 
has differentiated between common and individual questions by looking at 
the evidence necessary to prove the claims.90  If at least one issue common to 
the class predominates over the individual issues, the class action is proper 
under Rule 23(b)(3).91 
Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) has a similar requirement of co-
hesion among class members, but claims falling under this category typically 
must be for injunctive or declaratory relief.92  In Dukes, the Court explained 
the class was not an appropriate Rule 23(b)(2) class because plaintiffs were 
seeking individualized monetary damages.93  The Court declined to make a 
definitive statement as to whether classes seeking monetary damages can ever 
be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) but did find that “at a minimum, claims for 
individualized relief . . . do not satisfy the Rule.”94  The Court reasoned this 
type of relief is inappropriate because “[t]he key to the [Rule 23](b)(2) class 
is ‘the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted –
 the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlaw-
ful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.’”95 
 
 85. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 359. 
 86. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997) (“[Q]uestions 
of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members.”). 
 87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment). 
 88. 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997). 
 89. Id. at 593–94. 
 90. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (stating that 
individual questions require evidence that varies between members of the class, while 
common questions require the same evidence for each member). 
 91. Id. at 1045. 
 92. See Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 93. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 361–62. 
 94. Id. at 360 (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. 
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The requirement of cohesion among class members and the relief sought 
is closely related in a Rule 23(b)(2) class.96  The Court has found that to 
prove cohesion a class can demonstrate “the party opposing the class has 
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class.”97  The 
Advisory Committee Notes to the Rules further explain Rule 23(b)(2) is ap-
propriate when “[a]ction or inaction is directed to a class within the meaning 
of this subdivision even if it has taken effect or is threatened only as to one or 
a few members of the class, provided it is based on grounds which have gen-
eral application to the class.”98 
A problem courts often run into when determining if class certification 
is appropriate is the line between inquiries of class certification and determi-
nation of the merits of the class members’ claims.99  In Amgen Inc. v. Con-
necticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds,100 the Court clarified that a class 
does not need to demonstrate it will prevail on the merits of its claims in or-
der to meet the requirements of class certification.  The Court further ex-
plained that for a class seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3), the class 
must show “questions common to the class predominate, not that those ques-
tions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.”101  In Amgen, a 
class of plaintiffs brought claims against Amgen, a biotechnology company, 
for securities fraud and asked for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).102  
Plaintiffs alleged Amgen made misrepresentations and misleading omissions 
that affected its stock price, causing economic injury to the proposed class.103  
Amgen argued the class could not meet the predominance requirement under 
Rule 23(b)(3) because it failed to prove Amgen’s conduct “materially” affect-
ed the stock price, which was an element of the cause of action plaintiffs 
brought.104  The court rejected this argument for two reasons: (1) materiality 
is an objective inquiry that can be proved “through evidence common to the 
class,” and (2) failure to prove materiality would not result in individual ques-
tions predominating over questions common to the class.105  Because the 
Court found the class alleged a “fatal similarity” among class members, 
therefore satisfying predominance, the claims would be best addressed at a 
 
 96. See id. (“Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory 
judgment would provide relief to each member of the class.”). 
 97. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997). 
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment). 
 99. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Retirement Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 465–
66 (2013). 
 100. Id. at 466 (“Rule 23 grants no license to engage in free-ranging merits inquir-
ies at the certification stage.”). 
 101. Id. at 459 (alteration in original).  
 102. Id. at 458–59. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 466. 
 105. Id. at 467–68. 
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trial or on a motion for summary judgment rather than at the class certifica-
tion stage.106 
The Court has also recognized that the line between class certification 
inquiries and inquiries into the merits of the claims is not always easy to de-
termine.107  In Dukes, in determining if the proposed class met the commonal-
ity requirement, the Court found that proving commonality “necessarily” 
overlapped with the merits of plaintiffs’ claims of employment discrimination 
because these claims involved understanding the reasoning behind employ-
ment decisions.108  While it is ideal for courts to separate the inquiries into 
class certification and determination of the merits, the Court has acknowl-
edged this line is often blurred. 
B. Environmental Contamination Claims 
Class action lawsuits often provide a vehicle for plaintiffs to recover for 
property damage or physical illness resulting from environmental contamina-
tion caused by negligent practices or clean-up efforts by corporations and 
industries.  The federal circuit courts have typically handled these claims 
differently, with some using a more plaintiff-friendly approach than others. 
1. Successful Class Certification in the Fifth Circuit: Deepwater Hori-
zon Litigation 
In 2010, the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil rig exploded in the Gulf of 
Mexico, killing eleven people and causing the worst oil spill in American 
history, which lasted almost three months.109  Thousands of plaintiffs brought 
claims against BP, the owners and operators of the rig, for property damage, 
and these were consolidated in one class action in 2012.110  After the class 
was certified by the Eastern District of Louisiana, the class reached a settle-
ment with BP.111  On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
seeking approval of settlement of the class members’ claims, objectors to the 
settlement argued the class should not have been certified because it “in-
clude[d] persons who have not actually been injured” and therefore failed to 
 
 106. Id. at 470–71. 
 107. Id. at 465–66 (“[W]e have cautioned that a court’s class-certification analysis 
must be ‘rigorous’ and may ‘entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s 
underlying claim . . . .’”). 
 108. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352 (2011). 
 109. Chad Bray, BP to Take $1.7 Billion Charge Over Deepwater Horizon Spill, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/business/dealbook/bp-oil-spill-deepwater-
horizon.html. 
 110. In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 900 (E.D. La. 2012), aff’d sub nom. In 
re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 111. Id. at 901, 914–17, 921–25. 
13
Holtzman: Widening the Power Gap: The Eighth Circuit’s Stringent Requiremen
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
550 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
satisfy the commonality requirement.112  The Fifth Circuit rejected this argu-
ment.113  In discussing the “common contention” requirement set out by the 
United States Supreme Court in Dukes, the Fifth Circuit held this “contention 
need not relate specifically to the damages component of the class members’ 
claims” and the “requirement that class members have all ‘suffered the same 
injury’ can be satisfied by an instance of the defendant’s injurious con-
duct.”114 
The Fifth Circuit further explained that a district court does not need to 
address the merits of the class members’ claims in order to certify the 
class.115  Because, as the Court determined in Dukes, Rule 23 does not set 
forth a “mere pleading standard,” the Fifth Circuit explained that even if a 
class needs to provide evidence to establish a common contention for purpos-
es of satisfying commonality, a district court does not need to determine if the 
contention is “correct” to certify the class.116  The Fifth Circuit therefore af-
firmed class certification in Deepwater Horizon, finding questions about 
whether BP was negligent or could have prevented the massive spill, whether 
BP acted timely in stopping the spill, and whether BP had a valid defense 
were all common questions that were “central to the validity of all the class 
members’ claims.”117 
2. Class Decertification in the Eighth Circuit: Smith and Ebert 
The outcome of Dukes and its heightened standard for meeting the 
commonality requirement have impacted the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit’s willingness to certify classes, especially in cases involving 
claims for environmental damage.118  In Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line 
Co.,119  the defendant (“Phillips”) owned a pipeline that spilled in West Al-
ton, Missouri, in 1963.  After the spill, the site of contamination was not 
properly remediated, and in 2002, nearby property owners discovered con-
taminants in their soil from this spill.120  Two separate classes formed and 
brought claims against Phillips, the first seeking injunctive relief and damag-
es for its nuisance claims and the second seeking compensation for medical 
monitoring as a result of potential exposure to the contaminants.121  The U.S. 
 
 112. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 808, 810. 
 113. Id. at 810. 
 114. Id. (citing Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011)). 
 115. Id. at 811 (“There is no need to resolve the merits of the common contention 
at the Rule 23 stage . . . .”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See, e.g., Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2017); Ebert 
v. General Mills, Inc., 823 F.3d 472 (8th Cir. 2016); Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe 
Line Co., 801 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 119. Smith, 801 F.3d at 922. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 923. 
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District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri certified only the first class, 
but the Eighth Circuit decertified the class on appeal.122 
The Eighth Circuit decertified the class because plaintiffs could not 
show they were commonly affected by the contamination and accordingly 
could not meet the commonality requirements under Rule 23(a)(2).123  Be-
cause plaintiffs could not all prove the contamination affected, or even 
touched, each class member’s land, the Eighth Circuit agreed with Phillips 
that “absent the injury of actual contamination . . . plaintiffs cannot meet the 
Rule 23 requirements of commonality or typicality” because they failed to 
prove a “classwide injury.”124  In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit 
further held “fear of contamination . . . [was] not a sufficient injury to support 
a claim for common law nuisance in the absence of proof.”125 
In Ebert v. General Mills, Inc.,126 the defendant (“General Mills”) 
owned an industrial facility in the Como neighborhood of Minneapolis.  For 
about fifteen years, General Mills dumped as much as one thousand gallons 
of hazardous waste in the ground at the facility.127  After working with the 
EPA to clean up the land, remnants of the hazardous waste were found in the 
soil vapor of the Como neighborhood in 2013.128  Residents brought a class 
action suit against General Mills for “threatening home and business owners” 
in the area and decreasing property values.129  After the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Minnesota certified the class, the Eighth Circuit reversed, 
finding the district court abused its discretion in determining the class satis-
fied the predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3).130 
Finding the class did not meet the predominance requirement, the court 
emphasized that allowing the class to proceed would “require an inquiry into 
the causal relationship between the actions of General Mills and the resulting 
alleged vapor contamination” and that this type of inquiry was not “suitable 
for class-wide determination.”131  The court acknowledged that questions 
common to the class existed, and while this might have been enough for the 
class to meet Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement, the analysis under 
Rule 23(b)(3) of common questions is one that is “qualitative rather than 
quantitative.”132  Because the court determined class members would need to 
 
 122. Id. at 925, 927. 
 123. Id. at 927. 
 124. Id. at 926. 
 125. Id. at 927. 
 126. Ebert v. General Mills, Inc., 823 F.3d 472, 475 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 476. 
 130. Id. at 479. 
 131. Id. (“To resolve liability there must be a determination as to whether vapor 
contamination, if any, threatens or exists on each individual property as a result of 
General Mills’ actions, and, if so, whether that contamination is wholly, or actually 
attributable to General Mills . . . .”). 
 132. Id. at 478. 
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produce individual evidence of their injuries, the court found that individual 
questions of the class predominated over issues common to the class.133  The 
court decertified the class on these grounds, finding the individual inquiries 
necessary to determining liability made this case “not suitable for class-wide 
determination.”134 
In contrast to the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Deepwater Horizon, the 
Eighth Circuit in Smith and Ebert placed greater focus on the injuries suffered 
by plaintiffs seeking class certification in determining whether the proposed 
classes met the requirements of commonality and predominance.135  In 
Deepwater Horizon, the Fifth Circuit instead focused on the question the 
class raised regarding BP’s conduct to find the class met the requirements of 
commonality and predominance.136 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
The Eighth Circuit decertified the class in Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp. 
for failing to meet the requirements under Rule 23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).137  
This decision centered mainly on the commonality and predominance re-
quirements under Rule 23 and whether there was a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding the class members’ claim that Exxon breached the easement 
contracts.138  This Part discusses the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning that the 
claims Plaintiffs brought were not proper for a class action. 
A. Decertifying the Class 
The Eighth Circuit decertified the class because Plaintiffs could not 
meet the requirements for commonality and predominance under Rule 
23(a)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3).139  With the understanding that Exxon operated 
the Pipeline as “individual segments,” the court determined Plaintiffs could 
not prove a common contention because “Exxon’s actions, or inactions, on 
one individual’s land would not necessarily implicate the interests of other 
landowners.”140  Because of this, the court stated that even if Exxon did oper-
ate the entirety of the Pipeline in the same way, the effect of this on each 
 
 133. Id. at 479. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 481; Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co., 801 F.3d 921, 927 (8th 
Cir. 2015). 
 136. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 818 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 137. 856 F.3d 1150, 1156–57 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 138. Id. at 1155–56. 
 139. Id. at 1156–57. 
 140. Id. at 1156 (quoting Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 4:13CV00232 BSM 
WL 11090403, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 17, 2015)). 
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class member would still be different because of the varied nature of the indi-
vidual properties and easement contracts.141 
The Eighth Circuit used a similar analysis of the claims to determine 
Plaintiffs could not meet the “far more demanding” requirement of predomi-
nance under Rule 23(b)(3).142  Because Exxon operated the Pipeline as sepa-
rate units, unique to each piece of property the Pipeline touched, the court 
found that determining liability in this case would have required an assess-
ment of each property to determine what injury each Plaintiff suffered.143  
Because of this, the Eighth Circuit found individual questions necessarily 
predominated over issues common to the class.144 
B. No Breach of Easement Contracts Under Arkansas Law 
In addition to decertifying the class, the Eighth Circuit also granted 
summary judgment in favor of Exxon because there was no issue of material 
fact as to whether Exxon breached its easement contracts with Plaintiffs.145  
The court stated that for Plaintiffs to show a breach in this case, “they must 
demonstrate Exxon has failed to perform a duty.”146  Resting on its conclu-
sion that under Arkansas law easement contracts do not give rise to a duty of 
the easement holder to maintain or repair the easement, the court found Exx-
on did not breach its easement contracts with Plaintiffs.147 
The Eighth Circuit applied the reasoning set forth in City of Crosett v. 
Riles to reach its conclusion that easement contracts do not create an affirma-
tive duty to repair or maintain under Arkansas law.148  While the court agreed 
with Plaintiffs’ argument that easement holders have a duty to not interfere 
with the “use and enjoyment” of the servient estate, Plaintiffs failed to estab-
lish this because their allegations of property damage were “vague” and failed 
to show an actual physical injury.149  Even though this was a question of fact, 
the Eighth Circuit found the evidence was so vague it was “insufficient to 
 
 141. Id. at 1156–57. 
 142. Id. at 1156. 
 143. Id. at 1156–57. 
 144. Id. at 1157. 
 145. Id. at 1159. 
 146. Id. at 1158. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1159; see also City of Crossett v. Riles, 549 S.W.2d 800 
(1977) (regarding Plaintiffs with property subject to easements owned by the City 
brought action against City for failing to maintain the easements, resulting in flood-
ing).  But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 4.13(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) 
(noting the “beneficiary of an easement” is required “to repair and maintain the por-
tions of the servient estate” and to “prevent unreasonable interference with the servi-
ent estate”). 
 149. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1158–59. 
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raise a genuine issue of material fact” and summary judgment for Exxon was 
appropriate.150 
V. COMMENT 
This Part further discusses the Eighth Circuit’s decision to decertify the 
class in Webb for failing to meet the commonality and predominance re-
quirements under Rule 23.  The Eastern District of Arkansas initially certified 
the class in Webb under Rule 23(b)(3).151  This Part argues the court should 
have originally certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2) but certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3) was also appropriate.   
Specifically, this Part argues a more preferable approach would have 
been to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2), but the Eastern District of Ar-
kansas mistakenly found a claim for breach of contract does not fall under 
injunctive relief for the purposes of class certification.  This Part also argues 
the Eighth Circuit inappropriately determined the merits of the claims when 
deciding whether to certify the class and, for these reasons, the class should 
have been allowed to proceed. 
A. The Eastern District’s Failure to Certify the Class Under            
Rule 23(b)(2) 
After the Eastern District originally certified the class in Webb under 
Rule 23(b)(3), the crux of this case on appeal became whether this class was 
proper for Rule 23(b)(3) adjudication.152  However, the Eastern District and 
the Eighth Circuit failed to recognize that class certification in this case under 
Rule 23(b)(2) was not only proper but preferable to certification under Rule 
23(b)(3).153 
The two main requirements under a Rule 23(b)(2) class action are that 
the class must be sufficiently cohesive and seeking injunctive or declaratory 
relief.154  The Eastern District erroneously determined in its first class certifi-
cation hearing that class certification was not proper under Rule 23(b)(2) 
because Plaintiffs were seeking either rescission of the contracts or specific 
performance, which are equitable remedies that the court determined were not 
“tantamount to the injunctive relief that must be asserted.”155  This is plainly 
incorrect given that equitable remedies, such as contract rescission, are by 
 
 150. Id. at 1159. 
 151. Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 4:13CV00232 BSM, 2014 WL 11498052, 
at *1 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 12, 2014), aff’d on other grounds, 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 
2017). 
 152. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1157. 
 153. Id. at 1156–57. 
 154. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 155. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *4. 
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nature injunctive relief.156  The court cites to Dukes, where the United States 
Supreme Court stated that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not speak of ‘equitable’ reme-
dies generally but of injunctions and declaratory judgments.”157  However, in 
the context of this quote, the Court determined the backpay the class in Dukes 
was seeking was not injunctive or declaratory relief, as required by Rule 
23(b)(2).158  This comparison is entirely different when determining if con-
tract rescission and specific performance are forms of injunctive relief.  While 
the class in Dukes tried to argue backpay was an equitable remedy rather than 
a monetary remedy, the Court was not convinced.159  In Webb, however, the 
class sought rescission of the contracts or specific performance, which are 
two remedies that squarely fall within the meaning of injunctive relief re-
quired by Rule 23(b)(2). 
The class in Webb would have further met the requirement of cohesion 
under Rule 23(b)(2) by showing Exxon acted on grounds “generally applica-
ble to the class.”160  While the Eastern District and Eighth Circuit decided to 
view the Exxon’s operation of the Pipeline as a series of separate units, this 
understanding fails to consider the actual physical nature of the Pipeline.  
Exxon’s decisions to maintain, or not maintain, the Pipeline on one person’s 
land necessarily affected the status of the Pipeline on another person’s land 
because the Pipeline was a singular physical entity connected from start to 
finish.  Further, Exxon sends the oil through the entirety of the Pipeline – not 
just through individual segments..  The way the Pipeline connected all the 
class members by nature of its physical presence on each class member’s 
property would be enough to satisfy the cohesion requirement under Rule 
23(b)(2) and present a common question of whether Exxon’s course of con-
duct amounted to a breach.161  It appears the class deliberately chose to bring 
a breach of contract claim as opposed to a mass tort action162 because of the 
way the breach of contract claim fits within the requirements of a Rule 
23(b)(2) action.  For these reasons, the class should have been certified under 
Rule 23(b)(2). 
 
 156. See 11A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2941, West (database update Apr. 2019); 
5 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. § 49:38, West (database updated Nov. 2018). 
 157. Webb, 2014 WL 11498052, at *4. 
 158. Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 365 (2011). 
 159. See id. 
 160. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997). 
 161. See Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ., 797 F.3d 426, 442 
(7th Cir. 2015) (certifying a class of teachers who alleged discrimination by school 
board under Rule 23(b)(2) and finding “the fact that the plaintiffs might require indi-
vidualized relief does not preclude certification of a class for common equitable re-
lief”). 
 162. Class certification is notoriously difficult to attain with mass tort claims. 
19
Holtzman: Widening the Power Gap: The Eighth Circuit’s Stringent Requiremen
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
556 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
B. The Eighth Circuit’s Decision to Decertify the Class 
Even though, in Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., class certification would 
have been preferable under Rule 23(b)(2), the Eighth Circuit’s decision not to 
certify the class under Rule 23(b)(3) was still flawed.  In this ruling, the 
Eighth Circuit adopted a stringent analysis of the commonality and predomi-
nance requirements compared to other federal circuit courts considering class 
certification after Dukes.163  In concluding the class did not meet the com-
monality requirement, the court focused its reasoning on the question of 
whether Plaintiffs all suffered the same injury.164  In Dukes, the Court held 
that for class members to suffer the same injury for the purposes of class cer-
tification, it is not enough that they “have all suffered a violation of the same 
provision of law.”165  The class members’ claims, the Court explained, must 
depend upon a common contention that is capable of “classwide resolu-
tion.”166 
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Deepwater Horizon was more favorable 
to plaintiffs bringing claims arising from environmental contamination than 
the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Webb.  In Deepwater Horizon, the Fifth 
Circuit determined the common contention a class alleges does not need to 
“relate specifically to the damages component of the class members’ 
claims.”167  The Eighth Circuit in Webb, however, focused on the damages 
claims of class members in emphasizing determination of injury would re-
quire individual assessments of each class members’ land.168  Because of this, 
the court reasoned, the claims of the class members did not rest upon a com-
mon contention.169  However, the injury the class suffered in Webb is much 
more analogous to the injury the class suffered in Deepwater Horizon than in 
Dukes.  The class in Webb suffered injury because of a uniform practice by 
Exxon of not maintaining or repairing the Pipeline while simultaneously 
transporting double the amount of product through it in breach of the ease-
ment contracts.170  Just because the injury might have differed from property 
 
 163. See, e.g., Chi. Teachers Union, 797 F.3d at 440 (“The court need only re-
solve whether the same conduct or practice by the same defendant gives rise to the 
same kind of claims from all the class members.”); In re Nat’l Football League Play-
ers Concussion Injury Litigation, 821 F.3d 410, 427 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[E]ven if play-
ers’ particular injuries are unique, their negligence and fraud claims still depend on 
the same common questions regarding the NFL’s conduct.”). 
 164. Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 165. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). 
 166. Id. 
 167. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 810 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 168. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1156–57. 
 169. Id. at 1156. 
 170. Id. at 1153.  In Dukes, the Court found that individual questions predominat-
ed over questions common to the class because Wal-Mart did not have a uniform or 
blanket practice of discrimination; the conduct in question came from thousands of 
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to property does not change the fact that whether Exxon breached the ease-
ment contracts is a question common to all class members.171 
In Amgen,172 the United States Supreme Court cautioned against deter-
mining the merits of a claim in the class certification process.  While analyz-
ing whether common questions of the class predominate, the Court acknowl-
edged this can naturally lead to some crossover between certification and 
assessing the merits.173  The Court stated the merits should only be consid-
ered to the extent necessary to determine predominance.174  Justice Ruth B. 
Ginsberg, in the majority opinion, clarified, “Rule 23(b)(3) requires a show-
ing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions 
will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.”175  Accordingly, a class 
is not required to prove it will succeed on the merits in order to be certi-
fied.176 
The Eighth Circuit hinged its decision that class certification was not 
proper under Rule 23(b)(3) on the argument that Plaintiffs could not show a 
common contention because Exxon operated the Pipeline as individual seg-
ments, and therefore, its operation of the Pipeline in one area would not affect 
operation in another area.177  Not only does this argument fail as a practical 
matter – because the Pipeline is by definition one physical entity – but this 
conclusion illustrates that the Eighth Circuit engaged in the sort of “free-
ranging merits inquiries” that the Court warned against in Amgen.178  In fact, 
the Eighth Circuit granted summary judgment to Exxon on the grounds that, 
under Arkansas state property law, an easement holder has no implied duty to 
 
supervisors at stores across the country who were given discretion in the hiring pro-
cess.  Dukes, 564 U.S. at 355–56. 
 171. In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litigation, 821 F.3d 
410, 427 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding that the class of retired professional football players 
met the commonality requirement because the “NFL Parties allegedly injured retired 
players through the same course of conduct” and rejecting the argument that the class 
could not meet the commonality requirement because players’ suffered different inju-
ries); see also Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Co-op, No. 11-cv-04321-NKL, 2013 
WL 3872181, at *16 (W.D. Mo. 2013) (certifying a class of plaintiffs who owned 
property subject to easements with electric company and brought claims against the 
electric company for exceeding the scope of the easements; the court found that the 
class met the commonality requirement because determining whether or not the elec-
tric company violated the easements was a question common to the class). 
 172. 568 U.S. 455, 465–66 (2013) (“Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in 
free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.”). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 466. 
 175. Id. at 459 (alteration in original). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 178. Amgen Inc., 568 U.S. at 466. 
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repair or maintain the easement and therefore found Exxon could not have 
breached the easement contracts.179 
C. Future Impact 
Class action litigation can provide an even playing field between indi-
viduals and powerful industries.  Wealth and income status are necessarily 
connected to class action litigation involving environmental contamination.  
Property values are typically lower near industries and facilities likely to pol-
lute or contaminate nearby lands, and those who are able to afford to live 
elsewhere do.180  The Eighth Circuit, in its rulings in Webb, Ebert, and Smith, 
has sent a clear message to property owners that class litigation of their 
claims against big industry for environmental contamination will not proceed.  
The Eighth Circuit effectively removed class action litigation as a tool for 
shrinking the power gap between individuals affected by environmental con-
tamination and the big industries that cause such contamination.  The Eastern 
District noted the issues Webb presents for class action litigation moving for-
ward: 
The difficulty with this case is that the decision-maker has to decide 
between two objectionable options.  If Exxon’s position prevails, the 
message to easement grantors is that they are helpless in attempting to 
avoid a pipeline oil spill, and have no rights until after the oil starts 
spewing from the [P]ipeline.  And, this does not seem fair.  On the 
other hand, if [P]laintiffs’ position prevails, easement grantors would 
essentially be able to hold pipeline easement holders hostage, threat-
ening them with lawsuits or contract rescission every time the ease-
ment grantors possess any notion that the companies are not meeting 
the easement grantors’ personal safety standards.  And, this appears to 
be neither fair nor commercially acceptable.181 
The court recognized this was essentially a losing fight but decided fair-
ness to Exxon in this case trumped fairness to the class.182  Even where there 
was a clear answer for the class to proceed, like certification under Rule 
23(b)(2) in Webb, the Eighth Circuit still refused to allow Plaintiffs to bring 
 
 179. Webb, 856 F.3d at 1158 (citing City of Crossett v. Riles, 549 S.W.2d 800 
(Ark. 1977)). 
 180. See Emmie Martin, 13 Things That Will Trash Your Home’s Value, BUS. 
INSIDER (Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/factors-lower-home-value-
2016-11.  But see Lemings v. Eastridge, No. 4:12CV00342 JLH, 2012 WL 12076464, 
at *3 (E.D. Ark. 2013); Minyard v. Habbe, No. CA 00-1099, 2001 WL 1092818, at 
*4 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001). 
 181. Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 4:13CV00232 BSM, 2015 WL 11090403, 
at *1 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 17, 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 
2017). 
 182. See id. 
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their claims.  To better even out the playing field between individuals and big 
industry, the Eighth Circuit should have allowed the class to proceed.  Many 
of the issues the Eighth Circuit grappled with in decertifying the class, like 
whether Exxon breached the contracts, would have been better left to a fact 
finder to determine. 
Moving forward, states, especially those within the Eighth Circuit’s ju-
risdiction, should create more protections for residents affected by environ-
mental contamination caused by big industry to help bridge the power gap.  
While residents should maintain skepticism about pipeline construction, pop-
ular opposition to pipeline construction is only half the battle.  Special atten-
tion should also be focused on pipeline companies’ right to use eminent do-
main to seize property for new construction.183 
Allowing pipeline companies free range over land across the country 
while courts refuse to allow the individuals who are or might become affected 
by environmental contamination to bring their claims to court eliminates a 
major check on the power of pipeline companies.  While Exxon and BP were 
forced to pay hefty fines after major spills,184 these fines rarely have a major 
effect on giant oil companies.  In fact, just one month after the Pipeline 
leaked in Mayflower, the Pipeline leaked again Ripley County, Missouri.185  
Class action litigation could be an important check on big industries like oil, 
and potential findings of liability could force companies to operate at higher 
quality and safety standards – breaking the current cycle of waiting for a spill 
to occur and then paying fines. 
The fight over pipelines will only increase in intensity moving forward.  
To begin shrinking the gap between individual landowners and powerful cor-
porations, courts should give more leeway to class actions pursuing claims of 
environmental damage. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., the Eighth Circuit set in place stringent 
requirements for class certification under Dukes while overlooking appropri-
 
 183. See generally Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co. v. 6.04 Acres, 910 F.3d 
1130 (11th Cir. 2018); Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (2018); Ilya Somin, The 
Growing Battle Over the Use of Eminent Domain to Take Property for Pipelines, 
WASH. POST (June 7, 2016), 
https://wapo.st/1t67vrU?tid=ss_tw&utm_term=.4c4373f10ec4. 
 184. Timothy Gardner, U.S. Fines Exxon $2.63 Million for Arkansas Oil Pipeline 
Leak, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2015), http://reut.rs/1YRRD83; Nathan Bomey, BP’s Deep-
water Horizon Costs Total $62B, USA TODAY (July 14, 2016), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/07/14/bp-deepwater-horizon-
costs/87087056/. 
 185. Missouri Oil Spill: Exxon Pegasus Pipeline Leaks Again, One Month After 
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ate class certification under Rule 23(b)(2).  In interpreting the necessity of a 
common contention to satisfy commonality, the court held that where a pro-
posed class could establish a similar course of conduct by the defendant, 
commonality is not met if class members have suffered different injuries.186  
Even where a defendant’s course of conduct involves a physical pipeline run-
ning through plaintiffs’ properties, the court held this was insufficient to 
show a common contention.187  In its ruling, the Eighth Circuit has created a 
nearly impossible bar for class certification, especially in cases of environ-
mental contamination.188 
The total effects oil spills have on surrounding land and wildlife is hard 
to account for in terms of money, and usually takes years to fully comprehend 
the damage.  The spill in Mayflower severely impacted nearby wetlands and 
the wildlife inhabiting the area,189 and years after the Deepwater Horizon spill 
scientists are still attempting to understand how it fundamentally impacted 
wildlife in the Gulf of Mexico.190  While oil spills may just be the cost of 
doing business in a society so dependent on fossil fuels, the powerful oil in-
dustry must be checked from time to time to ensure safe practices and to mit-
igate the harms spills cause.  Moving forward, class litigation should be an 
important part of that check in the face of mass environmental contamination. 
 
 186. Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 187. See id. 
 188. See generally, id. 
 189. Miles Grant, As Arkansas Community Reels from Tar Sands Oil Spill, Wild-
life Remain in Peril, NAT’L WILDLIFE FOUND. BLOG (Apr. 3, 2013), 
https://blog.nwf.org/2013/04/as-arkansas-community-reels-from-tar-sands-oil-spill-
wildlife-remain-in-peril/. 
 190. Oliver Milman, Deepwater Horizon Disaster Altered Building Blocks of 
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